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Some Recent Developments in the Substantive
Law of Workmen's Compensation
Wex S. Malone*
After setting out the factors which make for change in the compensation structure, the author goes on to discuss three problem areas in
which that change is clearly visible: distinguishing between employees and independent contractors, determining tho rights of a borrowed employee, and deciding whether an accident arose out of the
employment. He concludes that the law of workmen's compensation is
developing in consonance with the social philosophy which underlies it.

The trend in workmen's compensation decisions during recent years
is not difficult to describe in broad outline. It can be said with some
assurance that today more workers recover under more circumstances
for more varied types of injuries against more defendants than ever
before in the history of workmen's compensation. This tendency,
however, is not new. The past few years have only witnessed in
dramatic form an acceleration of changes that has been taking place
in compensation litigation over a period of more than four decades.
We are still in a process of transition, but the pattern is becoming
clear, and we can define directions with a little more assurance than
would have been possible twenty years ago. Announcements of
liberal positions that once were found in only a few daring decisions
are now becoming ordinary conversation in the decided cases. The
citadel of employer defenses is eroding rather than exploding, but
erosion is taking place at such an accelerated pace that one may well
suspect that the structure itself is in danger of complete collapse.
We can profitably consider some of the factors that are at work in
producing change in the compensation structure. First, our basic outlook toward workmen's compensation is undergoing a radical transformation. At the inception of the compensation movement in 1910
the entire scheme rested on tenuous and suspicious foundations. Workmen's compensation emerged as an imported novelty that contradicted
the sanctified principle of fault liability. Although legal historians tell
us that the idea of liability based upon fault is itself a comparative
newcomer to torts law, nevertheless it had secured a strong hold upon
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; co-editor, Malone & Plant, Cases on
Workmen's Compensation (1963). This article is based upon an address delivered at
the Institute on Employee Injuries held at the Vanderbilt School of Law in November
1962.
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the sentiments of American lawyers and judges by the end of the
nineteenth century. In 1911 the New York Court of Errors and Appeals invalidated the first New York compulsory compensation statute
on the ground that the legislature, by imposing liability without fault
upon the employer and arbitrarily restricting the amount to be recovered by the employee, had deprived both of due process of law
under the federal and New York constitutions.' Even after this highly
skeptical attitude was abandoned, 2 judges and lawyers readily succumbed to the temptation to assimilate workmen's compensation into
the fault or negligence pattern with which they had become familiar.
Compensation, at the beginning, was relegated to the role of little
sister to tort law. Instances of this restrictive attitude were so commonplace that the bare mention of them is hardly necessary. There
was a prevalent attitude that the employee must deserve his compensation protection. He must show himself worthy of his award by
remaining faithfully at his task, by carefully avoiding any violation of
his employer's rules, by staying away from horseplay and dangerous
recreation, and by maintaining a careful lookout for his own safety.
Although he was no longer open to the charge of contributory negligence, as that term was understood at common law; yet his infidelity
to duty and his disregard of his own safety frequently served to place
him outside the course of his employment and thus to deny him the
protection of the statute. Doctrines borrowed from the older law of
master and servant were extremely prominent in the earlier compensation decisions. It was difficult for the courts to envisage a worker
as being within the course of his employment except at such times as
he was within the control of the employer. This type of thinking has
largely disappeared today.
At least two basic changes in our social outlook have worked toward
a reversal of our attitude toward workmen's compensation. First
is our increasing familiarity with the phenomenon of social legislation
as a means of providing benefits in terms of human need rather than
as a reward for good behavior or as a punishment for the employer's
indifference. We now live at home with social security and unemployment insurance. We spend our tax money for the provision of public
housing and health facilities for the underprivileged simply because
we have become convinced that this is the decent and honest thing
to do. Society now recognizes the necessity of absorbing in mass the
ordinary and expectable costs that flow from the highly complex and
dangerous urban life with which it is unavoidably confronted.
Secondly, we should recognize that even where torts analogies still
1. Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
2. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
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persist in compensation law, the tort law itself from which the analogy
is drawn is not the tort law of the past. The element of personal fault
is fast distintegrating even in ordinary negligence suits. The prevailing
presence of liability insurance and other means of loss distribution is
fast bringing to tort law the flavor of workmen's compensation. The
significance of this observation must be apparent to any attorney
familiar with the Federal Employers' Liability Act.3 In these cases

fault on the part of the railway lies wherever the jury may choose to
find it, and it is familiar knowledge that jurymen nearly always do so
choose. Recent developments in other areas of tort law, such as the
increasing reliance on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the notion that
the violation of any traffic statute is negligence per se, and the movement toward absolute warranty liability for manufacturers of defective
products, all suggest an eventual eclipse of the fault principle. In
short, the former little sister-the compensation scheme-is fast assuming the role of the big brother.
A final factor that has made for change in workmen's compensation
relates to administration. Subtle distinctions borrowed from the substantive law of negligence and from the concept of respondeatsuperior
have not worked out in practice when they have been directed toward
workmen's compensation controversies. They have proved to be too
artificial and too overrefined for successful administration in the great
mass of controversies involving employee injuries in modern industrial
society. We are tempted to suspect that they have introduced more
confusion than good. The demands of practical necessity have obliged
the courts to extricate themselves from a web of nineteenth century
technicalities that bears little resemblance to the actualities presented
in compensation claims. In short, judges have found themselves in
desperate need of blunter tools for decision.
Although the process of change that has resulted from the pressure
of the factors described above is obvious everywhere in the compensation structure, we cannot here attempt to survey the entire stage upon
which the drama is unfolding. For present purposes it is necessary to
restrict ourselves to just a few substantive areas where the pattern of
progress is evolving rather clearly and where the forces that are
making for change can be brought to the surface and examined.
I. EM PLOYEE DISTNGuisHED FRoM INDEPENDENT CoNTRAcroR

The distinction between the employee or servant and the independent contractor is one with which lawyers were thoroughly familiar
long before the advent of workmen's compensation. More than a cen3. 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C.

§§ 51-59 (1958).

1042

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 16

tury earlier it had become established that the master was answerable
for the torts of his servant, while the principal bore no responsibility
for the damage done by a careless independent contractor who injured a third person while carrying out the terms of his contractual
undertaking. These were torts cases, and the distinction between the
two relationships was drawn almost exclusively in terms of the control that the master was presumed to exercise over his servant. When
it is borne in mind that the doctrine of respondeatsuperiorwas strictly
a product of tort law and hence rested firmly on a foundation of personal fault, it is easy to understand why the control test was a matter
of great importance in the earlier cases. Here was an exceptional
situation in which a plaintiff sought to impose responsibility upon a
master who, concededly, was not chargeable with personal blameworthiness. The only conceivable legal theory which could justify
making such an innocent defendant liable for the misconduct of some
other person was that the blameless master had the power of control
over the conduct of his servant. It could be plausibly contended that
along with that power of control went responsibility for the servant's
misdeeds. It follows as a corollary to this theory that whenever the
power of control is lacking the entire basis for master-servant responsibility falls to the ground.
It is unfortunate that courts adhered to the control test when they
later attempted to distinguish the employee from the contractor in
workmen's compensation controversies; the traditional fault concept
(which afforded the sole justification for the control requirement)
had been deliberately abandoned by the legislatures when they devised the compensation scheme. Indeed, in compensation law there is
a sound reason for distinguishing the employee from the contractor,
but this distinction has entirely different policy roots from those that
support the respondeatsuperiortype of liability described above. The
employee's claim to workmen's compensation rests on the fact that he,
as a worker, is an economically dependent unit of his employer's
enterprise, and the question as to whether or not he was subject to the
control of his employer is an important consideration only to the
extent that the employee's subjection to control may suggest that he
was economically dependent upon his job. Experience has shown that
the ordinary worker is exposed by his employment to dangers which
he cannot meet with his own resources. Under ordinary wage practices the worker is not in a position to anticipate his accident costs in
advance and insist upon a rate of pay that would enable him to set
aside funds sufficient to make an advance provision for any expected
catastrophe. The basic purpose of compensation is to afford a means
whereby accident costs may be transferred from the worker to the
enterprise he serves, thence to be passed in diluted form to all those
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who benefit from the goods that the enterprise produces. In other
words, the employee is entitled to compensation from his employer
because of the recognized social need of his class and not arbitrarily
because he is subject to his employer's control.
By the same token, under this social policy the independent contractor has a less plausible claim for compensation when an accident
befalls him personally. The contractor himself represents an independent enterprise, and the contractor, if he is typical of his class, is
in a position to anticipate his possible accident cost in advance, to
capitalize it through insurance, and to insist upon a contract price that
will protect him and his workers. Since, presumably, he has already
exacted a charge for this purpose in fixing the charge for his undertaking, it would be manifestly unfair if his principal, the other party to
the contract, were thereafter obliged to reach again into his pocket and
pay compensation in the event of accident. Thus the difference between the employee and the contractor in compensation law resolves
itself into a difference with respect to the bargaining power of the
wage earner as contrasted with the bargaining power of the typical
contractor.
It is becoming increasingly obvious that the control test is fast
disappearing as an exclusive determinant of the distinction between
the employee and the contractor. Courts still speak of the test with
respect, but they employ it only in conjunction with other considerations, such as the relative expertise of the claimant, the specialized
nature of his undertaking, the fact that he does or does not provide
specialized equipment, or that he does or does not supply workers
of his own hiring. All these determinants, employed in every
conceivable permutation, are useful only to the extent that they may
tend to suggest that the injured claimant was initially in a position to
capitalize his accident costs in advance at the bargaining table. Whenever a court becomes convinced that the basic economic policy underlying workmen's compensation will be best served by ignoring all tests
it is likely to strike out on its own. Whenever the claimant must fairly
be regarded as the defendant's man, whenever he is basically dependent upon the latter for his livelihood, whenever the remuneration
for the claimant's services is found to have been figured on some
standardized basis, he will likely be regarded as an employee, irrespective of the dictates of any so-called test or combinations of tests.
Artists in nightclubs, 4 trapeze artists, 5 company physicians, 6 and at4. Russell v. Torch Club, 26 NJ. Super. 75, 97 A.2d 196 (L. 1953). Similarly as to
a model. Reyes v. Cowles Magazine, 5 App. Div. 2d 708, 168 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1957).
5. Zuijs v. Wirth Bros. Proprietary, Ltd., 55 N.S.W. St. 368 (New South Wales
1955).
6. West Virginia Coal & Coke Corp. v. State Compensation Comm'r, 116 W. Va. 701,
182 S.E. 826 (1935).
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torneys retained on a sustained basis by a single client? have all been
regarded in recent decisions as employees, since they were found to
be economically dependent units of the enterprise under which they
worked.
The tendency to refer the distinction between the employee and
the contractor to the economic realities of each situation as it presents
itself is perhaps most apparent in cases involving the sales agent. The
used car salesman or the insurance solicitor are typically subject to littie control. These persons determine their own hours of work, they find
their prospects when and where they can, and they devise their own
methods of operation. However, they are still subservient units of a
single enterprise. Their pay, although frequently in the form of a
commission, is entirely standardized. They are their employers' men,
and if they are injured they may well be entitled to compensation."
In a few states the legislatures have significantly altered the distinction between contractor and employee and have directed that
compensation be awarded to both classes of workers under appropriate
circumstances. In Louisiana the contractor who spends a substantial
part of his time in manual labor is regarded under the statute as
though he were an employee. 9 Recently the Louisiana court awarded
compensation to a contractor who employed about thirty men and
who, at the time of accident, was engaged in a contract operation that
grossed over 10,000 dollars per month.'0 His presence as supervisor
on the site in work clothes was regarded as being engaged in manual
labor within the intention of the statutory provision. In Wisconsin and
Oregon any person doing work for another is classified as an employee
unless he maintains a separate enterprise and holds himself open to all
comers." In Colorado a contractor is entitled to compensation so long
as the work being done can be regarded as a part of the business of the
principal. 12 The chief advantage of these statutes lies in the fact that
they enable the court or commission to sidestep many difficult administrative problems in distinguishing the two classes of workers. It is
noteworthy, however, that none of the statutes is all-inclusive. The
Louisiana requirement of manual labor, the Wisconsin and Oregon
exclusions from compensation of all those who maintain a separate
7. Egan v. New York State Joint Legislative Comm., 2 App. Div. 2d 218, 158
N.Y.S.2d 47 (1956). The same may be true of a minister. Meyers v. Southwest Regional Conference, 230 La. 310, 88 So. 2d 381 (1956).
8. Gresham v. Speights, 133 So. 2d 846 (La. Ct. App. 1961) (used car salesman);
Gordon v. New York Life Ins. Co., 300 N.Y. 652, 90 N.E.2d 898 (1950) (insurance
solicitor).
9. LA.REv. STAT. § 23:1021(6) (1950).
10. Welch v.Newport Indus., 86 So. 2d 704 (La. Ct. App. 1956).
11. ORE. REv. STAT. § 656. 124 (1961); Wis. STAT. § 102.07(8) (1957).
12. CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 81-9-1 (1953).
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enterprise, and the Colorado insistence that the work being done must
be part of the business of the principal all indicate that the purpose of
such statutes is to simplify but not to obliterate completely the distinction between the contractor and the employee.
II. BoRmowD EDmPLoYEEs
Another pernicious byproduct of an indiscriminate use of the control requirement in compensation controversies has been the borrowedservant doctrine. The employer who leases one of his regular workers
to another person enjoys a complete relief from compensation liability
so long as the loaned employee is subject to the exclusive direction and
control of the borrower. Here again we find that the courts of the past
were unable to envisage an employment relation between the lender
and the worker so long as the former was not in a position to exercise
control over the conduct of his employee. We may note again how this
contradicts the economic philosophy underlying workmen's compensation. The lending employer may be engaged in the regular business
of leasing out his workers, who are actually carrying out his business
while they are on hire. The lender may be in a position to exact of
the borrower a charge covering the cost of all anticipated accidents.
The worker may, and usually will, regard himself as the lender's man
rather than as an employee of the borrower. Nevertheless, until recently the courts tended to blind themselves 13
to all considerations apart
control.
of
power
a
of
absence
bare
the
from
There is a manifest tendency in the recent decisions to depart from
the old policy and to permit the loaned employee to subject either the
lender or the borrower to his compensation claim. The new tendency
first manifested itself solely in connection with the vocational lenderthe employer who is engaged in the regular business of leasing out his
workers together with some piece of complicated equipment. Here the
courts devised what has come to be known as the dual capacity
doctrine. In those situations where the worker was hired out along
with a piece of machinery the courts were able to observe that the
loaned worker was still within the control of the lending employer
with respect to all conduct involving the care or preservation of the
piece of machinery with which he was entrusted.' 4 This approach,
however, was fortuitous. The application of the dual control rule
depended in many cases upon a determination as to whether the
worker was operating the machinery at the time of accident or whether
13. Coughian v. City of Cambridge, 166 Mass. 268, 277, 44 N.E. 218, 219 (1896).
14. Mahoney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 240 Mass. 8, 10-11, 132 N.E. 384-396
(1921).
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he was injured while doing some other job that did not involve the
care and preservation of the machine. 15
A frontal attack upon all aspects of the borrowed-employee doctrine
has been underway for some time. At least five states (New York,
California, Illinois, Kentucky and Louisiana) have provided either by
statute or through judicial decision that both the lending employer and
the borrower are jointly liable for compensation to the loaned worker.16
He may successfully prosecute his claim against either or both. The
only remaining problem in these jurisdictions relates to the proper
ultimate allocation of the compensation cost between the two employers after the claim of the employee has been satisfied. A Louisiana
court has held that the borrower or special employer who has discharged the compensation claim of the worker is entitled to be indemnified by the general employer. At least, this is true where the
latter was engaged in the business of leasing out workers.' 7 A similar
result is reached in California by statute.'8 In Illinois, on the other
hand, the borrower must eventually bear the compensation burden
and indemnify the lender for any judgment secured against the latter.19

Ill. AccDENTs

AisING

OUT OF EMPLOYMENT

It is familiar learning that the injured employee who seeks compensation must establish that the harmful accident of which he complains
occurred during the course of his employment. In most states he must
go further and convince the court or commission that the accident also
arose out of his employment. This latter phrase has been the subject
of more sharply contested litigation than any other term in the typical
compensation statute. In essence the arise out of requirement is a

sound one. Workmen's compensation was designed to care for only
one type of misfortune-the industrial accident. One may well inquire,
what is an industrial accident? An accident does not meet this requirement merely because it happened fortuitously while the victim was
engaged in an industrial pursuit. Our compensation statutes proceed
upon the assumption that industry brings in its wake certain character15. See, e.g., Pacific Employers' Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 174 F.2d 1 (5th
Cir. 1949); Langevin's Case, 326 Mass. 43, 91 N.E.2d 920 (1950).
16. Famous Players-Lasky Corp. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 194 Cal. 134, 228 Pac.
5 (1924); Humphreys v. Marquette Gas. Co., 235 La. 355, 103 So. 2d 895 (1958);
De Noyer v. Cavanaugh, 221 N.Y. 273, 116 N.E. 992 (1917); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 138.1 (1962); Ky. REV. STAT. § 342.060 (1963); Comment, 26 CAL.. L. REV. 370
(1938).
17. Casualty Reciprocal Exch. v. Richey Drilling & Well Serv., 137 So. 2d 127 (La.
Ct. App. 1962).
18. CAL. INS. CODE § 11663. See Agronaut Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n,
154 Cal. App. 2d 703, 316 P.2d 759 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.1(4) (Supp. 1961).
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istic perils that are peculiarly associated with industrial operations.
The legislative intention was to deal exclusively with workday injuries.
Hence, industrial or workday accidents must be carved out from the
general body of perils that beset all mankind. The task of sorting the
risks was left by the lawmakers to the courts. Judges were told by the
legislators that the accident must arise out of the employment, but
they were not told how to go about determining whether it did so
arise. The courts met this challenge at first by devising the test which
has become familiar as the "increased risk" test. The risk, it was said,
must be greater for the employee than for one not so employed.
Although it is not to be denied that this test of "increased risk" comports with the policy that underlies workmen's compensation; yet it has
proved to be: almost impossible to administer with fairness to both
parties. In difficult cases its use often results in hair-splitting distinctions which are of no service to a sensible administration of law or the
cause of justice. The basic difficulty with the increased-risk rule lies
in the fact that it requires that the risk that caused the accident be
compared with an entirely unknown quantity. When can it be said
that the risk from which the injury resulted is greater for the workman
than for a person not engaged in the employment? Who is such a
person who is not engaged in the complainant's employment? Comparison here invites only disaster for clear thinking. Some risks, of
course, can be classified without difficulty as being peculiarly characteristic of the employment. The risk of injury by an exploding
boiler, for example, or the danger of accident by a derailed train, can
easily be associated specially with the calling of an engineer or a fireman. But the greater part of the accidents that befall industrial
workers-strains, injury by falling, burns, traffic accidents and similar
casualties-are fairly typical of mine-run accidents that occur in all
walks of life. It follows that a literal adherence to the strictures of the
increased-risk rule would have the effect of reducing the compensation act to virtual impotency.
The test of increased risk was subjected to constant pressure in litigation from the beginning. But it was in the street risk situations that the
urge for repudiation was most strongly felt. In the earlier cases of this
kind the courts were content to announce that only messengers, truck
drivers, and similar employees whose duties called them into the
streets with regularity were entitled to compensation if injured in
traffic. 20 It was difficult to conclude that the ordinary factory worker
20. For a fairly recent decision adhering to this position, see United Serv. Ins. Co.

v. Ronaldson, 254 Ala. 204, 48 So. 2d 3 (1950). At one time an even more conservative position was adopted in some jurisdictions. Donahue v. Maryland Cas. Co., 226

Mass. 595, 116 N.E. 226 (1917) (traveling salesman who spent more than half of his
time walking the streets denied compensation for injuries resulting from fall on icy
pavement).
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or office employee suffered any greater exposure to the hazards of the
public streets than "one not so employed." The essential increase of
risk was lacking. But the courts could not continue to resist the pressure of human drama in the street injury cases. Traffic presents a
constant and ever-growing hazard that must be faced daily by every
man who goes out to work, and if his job has brought him into the
streets at the time when he was injured, what difference should it make
that at other times he was not required to be there with any regularity? The occasion that really counts is the one that gives rise to the
claim. In short, the increased-risk test failed in these cases to meet the
more important demands of fair play. This proved to be its undoing.
As a means of circumventing the increased-risk rule in the street
accident situations courts resorted to a device that is familiar to all
torts lawyers-proximate causation. An accident that is proximately
caused by the employment, they observed, necessarily arises out of
the employment. If the duties of the employee called him to face the
traffic of the streets at the time of his accident and thus proximately
caused his injury, it could not fairly be said that the accident did not
arise out of the employment. As observers we cannot escape the conclusion that this was a radical departure from the older approach.
Even though the risk of being struck down in traffic was no greater
for the worker than for the highway-using public at large, the worker's
accident was regarded as arising out of his employment. 21 At first the
position just described was restricted to those risks which could be
regarded as peculiar to the use of the streets, such as traffic accidents,
and the exception became known as the "street risk" rule.
There followed a second stage in the erosion of the increased-risk
test. This resulted when courts expanded the term "street risk" so as
to include almost any mishap that occurred by chance in the public
streets. A wound by a stray bullet, a tripping on the curb, the bite of
a mad dog, and other similar misfortunes all arose out of the employment solely because they took place in the public street where the
employee was required to be in the performance of his duties.22 It is
obvious that in their eagerness to meet the demands of practical justice
in a special situation the courts had created a doctrinal anomaly. They
had singled out one special area, the public street, where the test of
increased risk was ignored, while they had retained the strictures of
the increased-risk requirement for all accidents that happened at any
place other than the streets.
A resolution of this anomaly in favor of the worker constituted the
21. The leading case here is Dennis v. White & Co., [1917] A.C. 479.
22. Everard v. Women's Home Companion Reading Club, 234 Mo. App. 760, 122
S.W.2d 51 (1938) (stubbing toe on curb); Katz v. A. Kadans & Co., 232 N.Y. 420, 134
N.E. 330 (1922) (chauffeur stabbed by madman while in the street).
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third and final stage. One illustration will suffice. In New Jersey a
butcher's helper was disposing of meat scraps in the rear yard of his
employer's establishment. While he was so engaged, a neighbor's child
next door let fly a toy arrow which by sheer chance struck him in the
eye. The employer answered his worker's compensation claim by
contending earnestly that there is nothing peculiar to the work of a
butcher's helper that causes him to face a greater risk of exposure
to a child's arrow than is faced by the public at large. The claimant,
he insisted, could not meet the requirements of the increased-risk test.
In reply, the worker pointed out that if his employer had ordered him
to go into the public street where an identical misfortune had befallen
him there would be no doubt that the resulting injury would have
arisen out of his employment under the established New Jersey streetrisk rule. If the bare fact that the employer's orders carried the worker
into the street where the mishap occurred was enough to characterize
the accident as one that arose out of the employment, why should the
result not be the same when the employer's orders carried the worker
into the back yard of the employer's own establishment and into the
path of the errant arrow? If there is to be a special street-risk doctrine,
why should there not likewise be a backyard doctrine, an open lot
doctrine, or an upstairs-on-the-third-floor doctrine? This type of argument came to achieve increasing recognition in the courts. The result
was the announcement of the broad principle to the effect that whenever the call of duty brings the worker to the place of accident (wherever this may be) the resulting injury should be regarded as one that
arose out of his employment.23 This principle, derived, as we have seen,
from the earlier street-risk rule, has since acquired a name of its own"positional risk" doctrine. Within the past few years the doctrine has
traditionally conservative Supreme Judicial
been adopted by even the
24
Court of Massachusetts.
The positional-risk doctrine, as described above, can be examined
profitably from another angle: it seems to represent a proposition that
the employee who is directly answering the call of duty at the time
he sustains an accident will be protected indiscriminately against any
danger that befalls him so long as the risk was not one of his own
making. The fact that the worker was securely within the course of
his employment at the time (because he was acting in obedience to
orders) has become a consideration whose persuasion overrides any
23. The most convincing and elaborately reasoned decision supporting this position is
Industrial Indem. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n, 95 Cal. App. 2d 443, 214 P.2d 41
(Dist. Ct. App. 1950). The case of the butcher's helper and the arrow, discussed in
the text is Gargiulo v. Gargiulo, 24 N.J. Super. 129, 93 A.2d 59& (App. Div. 1952),
aff'd, 11 N.J. 611, 95 A.2d 646 (1953).
24. Baran's Case, 336 Mass. 342, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957) (stray bullet).
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weakness in his showing with reference to the character of the risk
that brought about the accident. In other words, a very strong showing on the during-course-of side of the ledger can so operate as to
offset a decided weakness on the arise-out-of side of the balance sheet.
We are tempted to inquire as to whether the converse may not also
be true. If the risk producing the accident is one that can be readily
and intimately associated with the nature of the job, may compensation be awarded even though the harm was inflicted at a time when
and at a place where the worker was clearly outside the course of his
employment? Recent decisions suggest that such may be the case.
Again we may refer to the traditionally conservative state of New
Jersey for an example. The facts are from Meo v. Commercial Can
Corp., decided last year.25 Meo, the claimant, was the supervisor of
defendant's plant. At the time in question a strike was in progress, and
the claimant had been continuously engaged in strike-breaking activities on behalf of his employer. One morning while he was standing
in his own front yard, intending to enter his car for the purpose of
going to work, he was assaulted by disgruntled strikers who acted in
resentment of Meo's anti-labor activities. Meo was compensated for
the resulting injuries. Although it is clear that accidents occurring at
home are not generally regarded as happening during the course of
employment, yet the nature of the risk that brought about the assault
in this case was so peculiarly a risk of the job that this consideration
overrode the obvious weakness of his showing with reference to the
during-course-of requirment.
The same explanation accounts for a fairly recent Michigan decision in which a factory worker died of cyanide poisoning.26 In this
case circumstantial evidence satisfied the court that cyanide became
lodged under the deceased's fingernails or on his shoes while he was
at the employer's plant. He arrived home in good health and apparently ingested the substance into his mouth in some unaccountable
manner while preparing for bed. Expert testimony showed that he
must have died within five minutes after the substance entered his
mouth. Compensation was awarded his widow. The court was apparently not concerned with the fact that the accident occurred at
home and at a time when the worker could not by any stretch of the
imagination be regarded as within the course of his employment. The
risk of cyanide poisoning was a risk of the job, and the deceased, like
Meo, the strike breaker, carried the risk around with him after he left
the work premises. One can readily gather from the recent decisions
that the during-course-of requirement and the arising-out-of-require25. 76 N.J. Super. 484, 184 A.2d 891 (L. 1962).
26. Zytkewick v. Ford Motor Co., 340 Mich. 309, 65 N.W.2d 813 (1954).
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ment are not separate inquiries to be decided in isolation from each
other. Rather, the two seem to interact upon one another and to form
together a single indivisible context within which each situation must
be appraised.2 7
We observed earlier that the positional-risk doctrine is fast supplanting the older requirement of increased risk in many situations.
There remain, however, two clouded areas in which the courts continue to insist that the claimant must show that the nature of the job
or the working environment served to enhance the prospect of the
accident complained of. The first of these areas involve accidents
which must be attributed in part at least to the employee's own
physical condition or to his own behavior, or which are the outgrowth
of his own private life. These are commonly referred to as personal
risks and they are generally excluded from the protection of the positional-risk doctrine.
One is tempted to inquire why this is so. A worker is directed by
his employer to burn meat scraps in the back yard. If while he is
there he is wounded by a stray bullet, assaulted by a madman who
happened to be at large in the neighborhood, or shot for some entirely
unaccountable reason, he will be entitled to compensation solely because he is in a position to invoke the positional-risk doctrine, and
he can recover merely because his duties brought him into the path
of the bullet. But if the assailant of the butcher's helper happens to be
a personal enemy who finds him at work and shoots him because of
some grudge arising out of their private lives, the helper will be
obliged to show in addition that the general nature of his work or the
environment in which he performed his duties was calculated to increase the risk of such a personal assault. If he fails in this respect, the
court will conclude that the accident did not arise out of the employment, although concededly it happened during the course of it.2 Why
should this be so? An attack by a madman or the ricochet of a bullet
intended for someone else are surely no more characteristic risks of
the job of a butcher's helper than is the chance that an enemy who
bears him an old grudge will find his victim at work and assault him
there. In both situations the performance of duty has played a causal
part by bringing the victim to the place of injury.
Again, suppose that a worker who is walking toward the machine he
intends to operate falls to the floor for absolutely no accountable rea27. This is discussed in detail in Malone, The Compensable Risk, 31 Rocmy MT. L.
See also the splendid discussion in 1 LARsoN, WOR wEN'S COMPENSATION § 29 (1952).
28. The decisions so holding are legion. E.g., Devlin v. Ennis, 77 Idaho 342, 292
P.2d 469 (1956); Rice v. Revere Copper & Brass, Inc., 186 Md. 561, 48 A.2d 166
(1946).
Rlv. 447 (1959).
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son and suffers a head injury. The positional-risk doctrine will save his
compensation claim because his motion in doing as he was told
brought him to the place where he fell. It need not be shown that the
physical environment where he worked played any causal part; nor
need it be demonstrated that the worker's haste in reaching his
machine precipitated the accident in any way. But add to this identical picture the single fact that the worker was epileptic and that his
fall was caused by an epileptic seizure. Once this is shown he will lose
his claim unless he succeeds in showing in addition that the physical
environment in which he worked contributed to the occurrence in
some way.29 The increased-risk test has again been brought into play.
The epileptic worker may save his case by establishing that he was on
a ladder when he suffered his seizure, or that he was driving a truck
and that the seizure caused him to run off the road. But if the fall
from epilepsy occurred under such circumstances that it could plausibly produce the identical harmful result without reference to any
peculiarity of the place where he was working, the employee will lose
his compensation claim.
In both the situation of the personal assault and the situation of the
epileptic seizure it appears that the courts have retreated to the old
tort idea that the employee had only himself to blame if he was
injured and hence he does not deserve a compensation award unless
he can tie his injury to his employment in some way. This must be
regarded as a residual trace of the old fault notion that has been
repudiated in other areas of compensation law. The attitude described
is in derogation of the familiar notion that the employer takes the
employee as he finds him. The epileptic is entitled to the same compensation protection as the worker who is in good health. The employee who is careless or disobedient or who brings to his job a bad
moral background does not for that reason alone lose his compensation claim. By the same token, the fact that the worker's individual
health deficiencies or his personal life (rather than some neutral cause
outside the control of either party) has created the risk that culminates
in an accidental injury should not serve to deprive him of access to the
liberal positional-risk doctrine. However, apart from a few sporadic
decisions or dicta, 30 there is as yet little indication that the courts are
prepared to go this far with reference to the personal risk.
It should also be noted that the liberal positional-risk test can be
resorted to only in cases where at the time of accident the worker was
29. Henderson v. Celanese Corp., 30 N.J. Super. 353, 104 A.2d 720 (App. Div.
1954). The sharp and vigorous dissenting opinion of Clapp, J., is of particular interest.
30. E.g., the dissent of Clapp, J., in Henderson v. Celanese Corp., supra note 29.
See also Livingston v. Henry & Hall, 59 So. 2d 892 (La. Ct. App. 1952) (compensation
awarded for personally motivated assault under positional-risk doctrine).
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actively at work or was moving from one place of work to another as
directed by his employer. Injuries during lunch periods or during
periods of permitted idleness or rest may be regarded as within the
course of employment. But the employee who is injured at such a
time must go further on the arise-out-of issue and must show that the
nature of his employment increased the risk of accident and caused
it to be greater for him than for one not so employed.
One type of spare-time accident, however, is faring better in the
courtroom than it formerly did. A common source of industrial injury
is the risk arising from horseplay or boisterous antics among idle
workers. At one time horseplay injuries were definitely outside the
course of employment. The refusal of compensation was justified along
three different lines: (1) the horseplay injury represented a personal
risk brought on to the job through the worker's own impulse to
entertain himself or to cater to his fun-loving instincts; (2) horseplay
usually took place during rest periods or idle time, and hence this type
of accident could not fall within the protection of the positional-risk
rule; and (3) the claimant was frequently the aggressor and was the
originator of the prank that resulted in his injury. This type of situation suggested to the courts in the earlier cases that the employee had
brought his trouble upon his own head, that he was blameworthy and
hence did not deserve compensation. Employers were able to convince the courts that the act of originating the fun was tantamount
to aggression, thus affording the employer a defense under familiar
provisions of the statutes that expressly excluded accidents caused by
the employee's "wilful misconduct" or by his "intention to injure
himself or another."
Today horseplay accidents are receiving an increasingly sympathetic reception. The objection that the risk of horseplay is one that is
personal and is imported by the worker into his employment has been
met by the observation of judges and commissioners that roughhousing
and sportive play are expectable incidents of the ordinary working
day and are characteristic of healthy and exuberant workers. Such
pranks are no longer regarded as the product of some objectionable
idiosyncrasy on the part of the participating worker. 31 The defense of
"wilful misconduct" is rejected with increasing frequency in the
later decisions. Wilful misconduct, say the courts, indicates a serious
intention to inflict an injury, rather than the sportive instinct characteristic of American workers who clown during their idle moments.
31. Interesting recent decisions illustrative of the newer approach are Crilly v.
Ballou, 353 Mich. 303, 91 N.W.2d 493 (1958); Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 258

Minn. 306, 103 N.W.2d 876 (1960) (one of several youthful employees riding in truck
playfully threw raincoat over head of driver, resulting in collision; compensation
awarded).
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IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, it seems appropriate to observe that the substantive
law of workmen's compensation is tending to give an increasingly realistic expression to the social philosophy behind the American statutes.
Courts are slowly erecting a new and independent legal structure freed
of the ideas of fault and blameworthiness so readily associated with
tort law, and freed also from the fetters of the requirement of employer
control that at one time, at least, was characteristic of the law of
respondeat superior. Perhaps there has been no sudden breakdown
of earlier positions in compensation law, but there is an obvious
strengthening of the courts' appreciation of the new need and there
is ample evidence of the continuing capacity of judge-made law to
grow and to adjust itself to the dangerous industrial society in which
we live.

